International business research and risky investments, an analysis of FDI in conflict zones by Driffield, Nigel et al.
 1
International business research and risky investments, an analysis of 
FDI in conflict zones 
 
 
Nigel Driffieldª, Chris Jonesª & Jo Crottyb 
 
 
ªAston Business School, Aston University, Aston Triangle, Birmingham, B4 7ET, UK 
b Salford Business School, M225 Maxwell Building, University of Salford,43 The Crescent, Manchester, 
M5 4WT, UK 
A B S T R A C T 
 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the determinants of a firm’s strategy 
to invest in a conflict location. To the best of our knowledge, this has not been 
done before. We examine this using a standard model of international 
business, overlaid with the fundamental approach to corporate social 
responsibility. We start with the population of multinationals who have 
chosen to invest in low income countries with weak institutions. We then split 
this sample in order to distinguish between firms that have invested in conflict 
regions compared to those that haven’t. Our analysis then proceeds to explain 
the decision of those firms to invest in conflict locations by using a simple 
Probit model. We find that countries with weaker institutions and less concern 
about corporate social responsibility (CSR) are more likely to invest in 
conflict regions. Finally, firms with more concentrated ownership are more 
likely to invest in such locations.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The purpose of this paper is to examine investments by largely western firms into areas 
of conflict. The previous literature that we discuss below focuses on the extent to which 
FDI into such locations may impact on the instability of the region, or subsequently, 
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contribute to economic development, there is little work that seeks to examine the 
motivation of these firms to invest in such locations. To the best of our knowledge there 
is no prior work that examines the motivations of firms to invest in conflict locations, or 
why such locations attract a significant amount of FDI. We seek to extend the literature 
that focuses on particular examples, or develops conceptual or theoretical analysis of the 
links between government and business, by examining whether, using the lens of 
international business one can explain why some firms are willing to invest in such 
locations. As we discuss in detail below, the limited literature that exists merely focuses 
on the importance of natural resources. However, as we will demonstrate, the picture is 
somewhat more complex than this, with firm and host country level factors potentially 
more important. Our results, discussed in more detail below suggest that both firm and 
national level governance structures influence the decision by forms to invest in conflict 
locations, and that overall the results are similar to other empirical investigations of FDI 
flows based on the OLI paradigm, with profitability, cash flow and firm specific 
intangible assets all linked to the FDI decision. 
In 2005 a newly formed company received a good deal of hostile press in both Europe 
and the US for announcing that it intended to explore the gas and oil reserves in Sudan. 
The press reacted as though this was a unique and somewhat disturbing development in 
the international business environment1. In fact, what was unusual about the White Nile 
case was not that a firm from the West was willing to invest in a war torn region, but 
simply that a relatively small company had been set up for the specific purpose of doing 
so, rather than this being undertaken by one of the world’s largest firms. The total stock 
of FDI in conflict countries was US$ 169 billion in in 2009 based on UNCTAD data. In 
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the last 10 years more than 500 multinational firms have been involved in this. Despite 
this, and the importance that political scientists, development professionals and 
academics have attached to FDI as a vehicle of development, little is known about either 
the motivation this type investment. To the best of our knowledge, this paper represents 
the first attempt to examine these issues from the perspective of the firms motivation to 
invest in conflict zones, and presents the first analysis of the determinants of firms 
decisions to invest in such locations.  
The UN security council has repeatedly stressed the importance of inward investment in 
both conflict and post-conflict locations. On July 22nd 2009, four years after the UN set 
up a Peace-building Commission, the UN Security Council outlined the issues facing a 
post-conflict country. “The first is the need for a strong leader to stop ‘international 
agencies’ turf wars. The second is for money to be released in good time. Humanitarian 
funds come out of emergency budgets; peace-building usually comes out of development 
budgets. The UN cannot stop war unless it is also able to win the peace.”(UN 2009, pp. 
12).  
 Yet while, the role of inward FDI in stimulating development, building capacity and 
generating growth has been well investigated, little is known about FDI in the context of 
corruption, conflict and post conflict. There is a large economics literature (see for 
example Javorcik and Wei, 2009) on the impact of institutional quality on FDI inflow, 
and the general conclusion is that weak institutions adversely affect FDI. At the same 
time, there is a more limited international business literature on the impact of institutions 
on MNE strategies, see for example Meyer et al (2009). These literatures however 
seldom inform each other, the former content to note that FDI is deterred by weak 
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institutions (with the underlying inference that the Washington Consensus should be 
adopted to alleviate this problem), and the latter content to focus on the actions of firms 
after the investment decision is taken.  
Despite the importance of this interaction between international business, risk and 
political capital, and the importance of home country institutions, surprisingly little is 
also known about the motivations for firms to invest in such volatile locations. The 
purpose of this paper therefore is to seek to address these gaps and thus extend existing 
theory of international business to the analysis of firms who seek to invest in conflict 
countries. 
We build on the analysis of Rodriguez et al (2006), by examining the motivations of 
firms to invest in highly volatile climates. While this approach offers some additional 
theoretical and conceptual insight, and offers some linkages across the lenses of politics, 
corruption and CSR, it does not extend to more extreme cases, such as high levels of 
grand corruption (Rose-Ackerman, 2002) or conflict.  This paper proceeds as follows: in 
section 2 we discuss the very limited literature available for this area of research. In 
section 3 we outline our 3 key hypotheses and their theoretical basis. In section 4 we 
describe our empirical specification. In section 5 we discuss the empirical results. Finally, 
section 6 concludes our analysis.  
  
2. Literature review 
The literature in this area is extremely limited. There exists a large literature on the 
relationships between international business and institutions, but virtually all of it 
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addresses the issue in terms of corruption. This is well represented by empirical studies 
that seek to examine institutional development in the context of FDI flows, see for 
example Javorcik and Wei (2009) or Henisz (2000). Equally Meyer (2004) and 
Rodriguez et al (2006) offer conceptual treatments of the links between political and 
social institutions, international business, and corporate social responsibility. These issues 
are explored in the analysis of Cuervo-Cazurra and Dau (2009) that links institutional 
development to firm performance, and indirectly to firm location.  
More recently, Branzei and Abeldelnour (2010) examine the extreme cases of terrorism 
in developing countries, and the impact from the threat of terrorism in developing 
countries. However, their approach is one of a psychological analysis of resilience under 
threat, and employs household level information rather than firm level information. The 
focus of their paper is on local enterprise development, rather than international business. 
Indeed, Czinkota et al (2007) focus on the extreme example of terrorism, highlighting 
how terrorism impacts on international business. As they stress however, they are seeking 
to set a research agenda, rather than present new empirical work or a further theoretical 
framework. 
The literature on FDI in developing countries views political capital within the context of 
the resource based view of the firm. Frynas et al (2006) for example highlight the 
importance of first mover advantage in the context of generating political capital. 
Equally, there is a relatively large literature seeking to link FDI to corruption (see for 
example Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006). Javorcik and Wei (2009) argue that increased risk (in 
the form of increased corruption) reduces the likelihood of FDI. However, very little has 
been done on analysing the types of firms who invest in systematically risky 
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environments. Addison and Murshed (2001) highlight the fiscal dimension to conflict 
resolution, highlighting the role that inequality can play in stimulating local conflicts. 
Multinationals investing in unstable locations run the risk of being seen as more than 
innocent bystanders, where their investments serve to increase inequality, or increase the 
returns to certain resources. However, analysis of investments in conflict areas presents a 
subtle distinction from this literature. The key questions concern the motivation of firms 
to engage in FDI in such locations, and the types of firms so motivated. We therefore 
seek to extend the existing literature by seeking to explain this FDI decision.  
As has recently been noted by the UN (2009), conflict and post-conflict countries are 
beset by a large range of problems, including corruption, lack of governance structures 
and protection of property rights. Existing literature reflects the obvious, that such 
conditions deter FDI, at a time, it may be argued, that new capital investment is crucial 
for both infrastructure and private sector development, just as civil society is required for 
the rebuilding of the state. This point is also made by Rose-Ackerman (2008) in an 
analysis of post conflict countries, highlighting the role that corruption plays in 
facilitating development in the short term in post conflict countries. However, as Rose-
Ackerman (2008) points out, institutions must replace this informal process, and alleviate 
its cause.   
However, this literature does not focus on the nature of the firms investing or what their 
motivation is. There are two theoretical frameworks that offer some useful insight here. 
The first is that offered by Peng et al (2008) which focuses on the institution-based view 
of strategy, and stresses the role that institutions can have in making markets work, and 
facilitating strategic decisions through information flows. This leaves open the question 
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of governance at the firm level, and the decision making process that leads a firm to 
invest in a location beset by corruption. Standard analysis of governance tends to refer to 
principal–agent relationships. This offers an extension of Doukas and Lang (2003) who 
highlight the importance of ownership structures in explaining FDI, through this in terms 
of the risks associated with FDI, and the returns to “external” shareholders. One could 
argue, following the link made by Peng (2006), that FDI into corrupt regions must be 
very much a core activity, driven by market considerations. 
3. Theorethical analysis and hypotheses 
The stylised literature on foreign direct investment (FDI) by multinational enterprises 
(MNEs) has at its basis the ownership-location-internalisation (OLI) framework (Buckley 
and Casson, 1976; Dunning, 1979, 1988). The basic proposition of the OLI model 
continues to be valid, in the sense that MNEs expand into other countries and continents 
to take advantage of local resources and by leveraging their unique capabilities (Luo and 
Tung, 2007). Much of the literature on FDI and institutional quality is discussed in 
Bhaumik et al (2009) who argue that institutions provide location advantages, facilitating 
transactions and reducing risk. Similar arguments are made by Javorcik and Wei (2009) 
and Daude et al (2007) – who state that increased corruption increases the transactions 
costs of the investor, and the level of risk. It is clear that the analysis of institutions with 
respect to risk, and possibly transaction costs are directly applicable to the analysis of 
FDI in conflict zones, but the extent to which such locations also offer greater rewards, 
perhaps through first mover advantage or market power more generally are seldom 
discussed.  
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Our intention therefore is to extend IB theory to the case of FDI in conflict zones. As 
Henisz et al (2010) note: 
“Questions that remain largely unaddressed but are fundamentally important include: 
 What sort of trade or investment is particularly sensitive to conflict? 
 What sectors or product markets are particularly susceptible to cross-national or 
inter-temporal variations in conflict? 
 What approaches do different companies take towards reacting to an increase in 
conflict or mitigating their own exposure to existing conflict?” 
(Henisz et al 2010 pp762) 
Despite the lack of literature in this area, there are two frameworks that offer some useful 
insight here. The first is that offered by Peng et al (2008) which focuses on the 
institution-based view of strategy. What this therefore suggests is that in conflict zones, 
the other parts of the Peng (2006) tripod of industry based competition and firm specific 
resources dominate.  This however leaves open the question of governance at the firm 
level, and the decision making process that leads a firm to invest in a location beset by 
conflict.  
Ownership advantages and investing in conflict 
The literature on the importance of institutions for international business assumes that 
firms are deterred by weak institutions. Firms are deterred, not merely by corruption or 
low levels of law and order protection, but also by the unfamiliarity with this. Both the 
eclectic paradigm, and indeed the resource based view of the firm stress the importance 
of firm specific assets, and the importance of the ability to coordinate resources across 
international boundaries. The experience therefore in operating in countries with weak 
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institutions, or in risky environments more generally is then an important firm ownership 
advantage in the context of investing in conflict countries. Equally, firms from more 
stable economic and political environments are therefore less likely to invest in unstable 
ones. However, in order to suitably extend the existing theories of IB, one needs to 
incorporate the other two lenses of Rodriguez et al (2006), which are CSR and the 
political dimension. In order to do this, we borrow from the framework of Carroll (1979, 
1991, 1999). The CSR framework can extend IB theory, arguing that society expects 
businesses to fulfil their economic responsibilities within the law. In his 1991 refinement 
of this model, Carroll also asserts that the rules and regulations of not just the firm’s 
country of origin but also those of ‘local governments of the host communities in which 
they operate’ (Carroll, 1991, p 41) should be observed. Of course within conflict zones, 
‘the law’ within such host communities maybe difficult to define, access or interpret. 
This places a greater emphasis on the mitigating effects of home country institutions, and 
also the firm’s own corporate social responsibility and governance structures. This builds 
on Li and Vashchilko (2010), who argue that a major factor in explaining why interstate 
conflict deters FDI, while security pacts encourage FDI flows, is because of the implicit 
approval or disapproval that firms receive from their home governments.  
In addition to highlighting firm level differences in the decision to invest in conflict 
locations, this also suggests a country level phenomenon, where firms from countries 
with specific types of governance and culture are more likely to engage in FDI in conflict 
locations. It has been widely remarked that the strongest institutions are in the developed 
countries such as the US, Germany, the UK and Japan, so one may expect to see less 
investment from such locations. Within the set of developed country firms, one may 
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expect to see higher levels of FDI into conflict zones from countries with higher levels of 
corruption and weaker institutions, for example Italy2.  
 
H1 – Firms from countries with weaker institutions are more likely to invest in conflict 
regions. 
Location Advantage 
Henisz (2000) seeks to extend IB theory to the case of FDI and corruption. This 
essentially argues that weak institutions generate increased transactions costs, and as such 
this deters FDI. One can simply view corruption and potential political interference as 
part of Dunning’s “L”, and simply view these as potential deterrents of FDI. However, 
these conceptual and theoretical frameworks exist with a relatively standard set of 
parameters, focussing on transition economies without reference to particularly extreme 
scenarios. Frynas (2006) extend the analysis to more extreme forms of political 
corruption, and illustrate how collaboration between business and governments can lead 
to a first mover advantage or potential attractions.  
However, of more significance is the link between sectoral differences and location 
advantages. Natural resource extraction for profit in a conflict zone could be interpreted 
as responding to a market demand and generating profit – the first responsibility of 
business (Carroll, 1979; 1991). 
IB theory stresses location advantages, and link directly to Carrolls “Economic 
responsibilities”. These are seen by Carroll as the first responsibility of business. Carroll 
describes the business institution as the basic economic unit in the society. As such it has 
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a responsibility to produce goods and services that society wants and to sell them at a 
profit.  
 
This suggests that the analysis of FDI in conflict locations needs to include a sectoral 
analysis. The company’s CSR image is potentially more important where external 
stakeholders are final consumers (i.e. the general public) than other businesses. Also, one 
can imagine that certain sectors are more resigned to investing in conflict regions than 
others. Extraction of minerals has historically been relatively sanguine about investing in 
trouble spots, driven by the location of the resources. 
 
H2: That sectors which are bound by natural resources or geography are more likely to 
attract FDI in conflict zones.  
Internalisation Advantages 
Empirical analysis of internalisation advantages typically focuses on the transactions 
costs associated with the alternative mechanisms of facilitating the international 
transaction. In the context of the sectoral differences discussed above, this may include 
arms length trading as opposed to ownership, in terms of either exporting, or access to 
raw materials. However, in addition to the sectoral differences, one also has to consider 
the ability of the firms to manage the newly created assets. Typical measures of this used 
in the literature are the number of subsidiaries a firm already has, and firm age, as well as 
firm size.  
In the context of FDI in conflict zones, one also has to consider business-state relations, 
and overlay the OLI model with the concept of CSR. This has been utilized to explain 
how large corporations not only have an economic duty towards their shareholders but 
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also have wider legal and societal responsibilities. For example, in ‘stakeholder’ theory, 
attention is placed on the fact that firms necessarily have a ‘normative’ and ‘moral’ 
obligation to all stakeholders, including not just its immediate shareholders, but the 
wider citizenry (Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Gibson 2000). This suggests that larger 
firms may be better placed to invest in conflict zones, having greater bargaining power 
with the domestic stakeholders. At the same time however, small firms, less likely to 
attract adverse commentary may also be attracted. Wood and Logsdon (2001) on the 
other hand see the corporation as having certain rights and responsibilities to various 
actors precipitating the need for firms to act as good corporate citizens.  
H3 : the relationship between firm size and the propensity to invest in conflict zones will 
be a U shaped.  
 
Ethical Responsibilities, Ownership structures and FDI  
Carroll describes these as “responsibilities (that) embody those standards, norms, or 
expectations that reflect a concern for what consumers, employees, shareholders and the 
community regard as fair, just, or in keeping with the respect or protection of 
stakeholders’ moral rights,” (Carroll, 1991 p. 41) What society ‘expects’ therefore is that 
the firm consult stakeholders widely. However, when considering investments where the 
morals or ethics of the decision may be brought into question, less, rather than more 
consultation may be expected.  
While the ‘ethical’ or CSR behaviour will be determined by all, or a combination of (a) 
the view the firm has of itself vis-à-vis ethical responsibilities; (b) pressure from 
stakeholders outside the host country on its activities; and (c) assumptions made by the 
firm of expectations from the host country, these pressures will vary between firms, but 
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in general, those firms less concerned about ethics or CSR will be more likely to invest in 
conflict regions.  
In order to operationalise this assertion, we rely on the links between CSR and ownership 
concentration. Nazli and Ghazali (2007) demonstrate that ownership concentration is 
associated with less attention to CSR at the firm level, consistent the burgeoning 
literature on CSR within international business, see for example Luo (2006), Rodriguez et 
al (2006), Husted and Allen (2006) and Strike et al (2006).  To a large extent, persistence 
of concentrated ownership reflects institutional weaknesses, especially absence of 
specialised intermediaries in capital markets. Strategic decisions for these companies are 
often taken by a closely knit group of controlling owners, without the involvement of 
other stakeholders. At the same time, it is often in the interest of this group to diversify its 
business interests outside the home country, largely to mitigate location specific risk 
(Rugman, 1975). Second, formal membership of corporate groups and informal networks 
facilitates access to internal capital markets, which makes it easier to raise the funding 
necessary for overseas expansion (Tasi, 2002; Child and Pleister, 2003; Liu, 2005; 
Erdener and Shapiro, 2005). 
 Firms with more concentrated ownership are less likely to face scrutiny from other 
shareholders (Bhaumik, Driffield and Pal 2010) and as such more likely to engage in 
activities that may otherwise attract criticism. As such, the link between such investments 
and ownership structures may not be restricted to the apportioning of the profit stream, 
but in terms of the wider considerations of the decisions to invest in unstable locations. 
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As Rodriguez et al (2006) point out, of the three lenses of corruption, politics and CSR, 
CSR is by far the least investigated. In general however, this literature stresses CSR from 
the perspective of external stakeholders, for example the firm wanting to stress to 
customers the ethical sourcing or testing of products. Avoiding contentious locations is 
therefore an obvious extension of this, but it is therefore trivial to infer that firms who 
care little for their external stakeholders’ views of CSR are most likely to invest in 
conflict regions. Husted and Allen (2006) offer an interesting viewpoint on this, which is 
to distinguish between local and global CSR. Husted and Allen (2006) rely on Gnyawali 
(1996) and Spicer et al (2004) to distinguish between local and global CSR, based on 
whether the stakeholders are in the home or host country. This is particularly important in 
the context of conflict regions, where local (host country) CSR may not be an issue, but 
adverse commentary locally can hurt the company in its home country or elsewhere. This 
suggests that there will be country level differences in the propensity to invest in conflict 
regions. 
However, as discussed above, the relationship between ownership concentration and 
outward FDI decisions is more complex than the treatments thus far offered in the 
literature would suggest. It is now well established that firms with concentrated 
ownership may be opaque, with low levels of protection for minority shareholders. In 
many countries there is evidence of “tunnelling” in group-affiliated companies that 
typically have concentrated ownership (Bertrand, Mehta and Mullainathan, 2002), and a 
general unwillingness to subject themselves to scrutiny. There is for example a relatively 
well developed literature on ownership concentration and the relatively low levels of 
voluntary disclosures (Chau and Gray, 2002; Berglof and Pajuste, 2005; Luo, 2005). 
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Engaging in FDI in countries with well developed institutions typically involves scrutiny 
by various stakeholders, including regulators, creditors, shareholders and (where 
appropriate) JV partners. The transactions costs of meeting the consequent disclosure 
standards can be substantial. As such, firms with relatively closed ownership structures 
are less likely to engage in FDI (Bhaumik et al 2010), but also may be more attracted to 
engage in FDI to non-OECD countries with lower levels of institutional development 
(Bhaumik and Driffield 2011).  
However, in the context of making investments that may be open to criticism, either due 
to excessive risk, or ethical objections, concentrated ownership may make this more 
likely. Concentrated ownership facilitates more risky or controversial FDI, as there are 
fewer constituents to get on board. Thus ownership concentration facilitates more FDI, 
but it is also likely to facilitate more FDI in more ethically dubious areas. Equally, such 
firms may be less concerned about adverse comment on their actions due to the relative 
weakness of other stakeholders. 
 
H4: firms with concentrated ownership are more likely to engage in FDI to conflict 
zones.  
 
 
4. The model 
The probability of a firm entering a location is determined by expectations of future 
profits (e).  In the expression below T is the expected life of the investment, and r is the 
discount rate: 
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Prob(FDI) = 1 [ ( )1 10   rpT p t pe ]                                   (1) 
 
This is clearly unobservable, but this model can be re-written as a function of a vector of 
firm and home country characteristics such that: 
 
( )1 1
0
  rpT p t pe  = ( ),( jij  )                                    (2) 
 
Where ij is a vector of firm level effects and j a vector a home country effects.  
This then translates into equation (3) - a panel probit model that explains variations in the 
propensity to engage in FDI to conflict regions at the firm level. The panel data 
methodology allows us to control for firm-level heterogeneity via our explanatory 
variables which we discuss in detail below. A probit model is ideal for studying data with 
an independent variable which is binomially distributed. You can express probit models 
in terms of the event probability:  
)'()()1(
'
βx
x
 


 dttFDIP                                                                                (3) 
where   is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. The probit model is 
essentially a linear regression of the Z score of the event probability on the dependent 
variable (FDI). To interpret the coefficient estimates therefore, researchers generally look 
at the estimated signs of the regression coefficients or calculate the marginal effects. We 
leave the latter for the appendix and the former are reported in the text. For more 
information on probit models see Liao (1994). 
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Random Effects Probit: 
In reality we don’t actually use the simple probit model, we use a random effects probit 
model of the following form (see: Arulampalam 1998) 
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            (3) 
Where *ity  is a latent variable which is unobservable, y is the observed outcome, itx  is the 
vector of time varying and time invariant variables which are assumed exogenous with 
their influence on *ity , it  is the vector of parameters, it  is the individual unobservable 
effect and itu  is the random error.  
 
 
4.1 The Applied Model 
 
The model that we estimate is then developed from the standard firm level FDI literature 
that seeks to construct a specification from standard IB theory. This is discussed at length 
in a number of review articles, in economics and  regional science, as well as 
international business and strategy, see for example Wiersema, and Bowen (2008), 
Driffield and Munday (2000), Bhaumik et al (2010) Girma (2002) . We employ a series 
of control variables to capture differences in firm specific advantages; size, performance 
and intangible assets, and a variable strongly linked to the ability to fund FDI, in the form 
of free cash flow3. We also capture the ability of firms to manage overseas assets, with 
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the number of existing foreign subsidiaries and the number of directors on the board in 
20094. We augment this with variables highlighted in the hypotheses, the host country of 
the MNE, a vector of institutional characteristics of the home country, a set of sectoral 
dummies, and the ownership concentration of the parent firm. Thus, the model that is 
estimated becomes: 
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In equation (3), the independent variable is jitCONFDI  by firm i at time t, in conflict 
location j equals 1 if a multinational company has a subsidiary located in a conflict 
country; and equals zero otherwise. The vector of FSA terms captures the measures of 
firm specific assets. Second order terms of age and size are also included, as much of the 
literature defines a turning point in these relationships, see for example Hennart and Park 
(1993) and the literature that builds upon this. The ownership variable measures 
ownership concentration by two methods depending on the specification. The literature 
on CSR that we discuss above (see for example Rodriguez et al (2006) tends to relate 
ownership to CSR in terms of a dominant owner or single large shareholder, and so we 
employ the shareholding percentage of the largest shareholder. However, the more 
general CSR work of Spicer et al (2004) for example relates the issue to ownership 
concentration more generally through the discussion of a wider group of stakeholders. 
We therefore consider both the largest shareholder by percentage, and secondly we use a 
herfindahl index of ownership concentration calculated across all shareholders.  As can 
be seen in Appendix A both measures are highly correlated, and so we subsequently 
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estimate the model using the alternative measures, rather than including both at the same 
time. We also include other measures of governance, including  the number of directors 
that a firm has, and the number of existing subsidiaries. It is possible for example that the 
more directors a firm has, the less likely it is to contemplate risky or controversial 
investments. Finally, we include  seven sector-specific dummy variables based on NACE 
2-digit codes. These are: Mining (included to capture resource seeking FDI), 
Manufacturing, Agriculture, Transportation Services, Public Services, High-Technology 
Services and Low-Technology Services. The institution measures are the ICRG variables 
score for the parent firm’s home country in terms of Corruption, Internal Conflict and 
Law & Order (we discuss this in more detail below).  
 
5. Data 
This paper uses ORBIS a firm-level dataset provided by Bureau van Dijk, which is a 
leading electronic publisher of annual accounts information for millions of firms across 
the whole globe. We only use a subset of this database. We start by defining the set of 
countries that have low levels of human development, and collect the firm level data on 
all firms that have invested in these countries. We then identify the countries that 
experienced some form of conflict in a given year, and identify incidents of FDI into 
these countries as the variable of interest5.  In terms of explaining this behaviour, we 
download a number of statistics that are frequently included in a standard FDI model for 
the parent multinational companies that have a majority stake in a subsidiary based in a 
developing country. No information about the subsidiaries is utilised as this data is often 
missing, we are therefore focusing on the parent. We create an unbalanced panel of firms 
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consisting of 16900 observations over the period 1997-2009. In total there are 2509 firms 
that have invested in regions with a low level of human development6. Out of these, 540 
have invested in a region engaged in some sort of conflict. This allows us to construct our 
dependent variable jitFDI that distinguishes between the two and allows us to run a 
simple probit model.  
The key variables included in our analysis are profitability, defined as return on assets 
using EBIT, sales, cash-flow, a ratio of intangible fixed assets to total assets, the number 
of subsidiaries, the number of directors, firm age and the concentration variable. In 
addition to this we generate: (1) a set of sectoral dummies based on NACE 2-digit codes, 
these are mining, manufacturing, agriculture, transportation services, public services, 
high-technology services and low-technology services7; and (2) a set of country specific 
dummies based on each multinational’s home country, these are identified for the UK, 
US, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Germany, France, Japan, Braziland India.  
To determine which countries are categorised as experiencing conflict, in order to 
generate the list of CONFLICT countries, we take advantage of the International Country 
Risk Guide (ICRG) constructed by countryrisk.com. There are numerous indices 
covering governance and institutions that are available. Many reflect the political 
persuasion of the institute involved, or the purpose of the data collection. The ICRG data 
is generated in order to provide advice or guidance to firms contemplating FDI decisions. 
As such, it is the database most geared to the private sector, and divorced from particular 
political views of institutions or institutional development. They use 12 measures of 
political risk to assess a number of different countries. One of the measures is called 
Internal Conflict and is according to ICRG: 
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“An assessment of political violence in the country and its actual or potential 
impact on governance. The highest rating is given to those countries where 
there is no armed or civil opposition to the government and the government 
does not indulge in arbitrary violence, direct or indirect, against its own 
people. The lowest rating is given to a country embroiled in an on-going civil 
war. The risk rating assigned is the sum of three subcomponents, each with a 
maximum score of four points and a minimum score of 0 points. A score of 4 
points equates to Very Low Risk and a score of 0 points to Very High Risk.” 
 
The three subcomponents ICRG distinguishes between are Civil War/Coup Threat, 
Terrorism/Political Violence and Civil Disorder. In order to categorise the ‘conflict 
countries’ we average each countries score from 1997 to 2009, if this score is less than 
6.5 the country is classified as a conflict country and therefore all of the parent companies 
that have a subsidiary in that corresponding country are identified as a company that 
invests in a conflict region. The conflict countries identified are Bangladesh, Colombia, 
Congo DR, Haiti, Iraq, Nigeria, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, and Zimbabwe.  
 
6. Analysis 
Before moving to the econometric analysis, it is important to discuss some features of the 
data. Firstly, Table 1 highlights the differences in intuitional quality between different 
regions/countries used in the subsequent analysis. The institutional data are taken from 
the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) constructed by countryrisk.com. As well as 
their measure of internal conflict (discussed above) they also have statistics on corruption 
and law & order. The data in Table 1 contains an average taken from 1997-2009 for each 
of these variables for a number of key countries. Freedom from Corruption is an 
assessment of corruption within the political system it has maximum score of 6. Law & 
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Order is split up into two components. The Law sub-component is an assessment of the 
strength and impartiality of the legal system, while the Order sub-component is an 
assessment of popular observance of the law. The maximum score for this variable is 6. 
The internal conflict variable is discussed above.  
 
Table 1 here  
 
As can be seen across each country there is considerable heterogeneity. The data follows 
a consistent and familiar pattern, with the developing countries Brazil and India all 
scoring lower on average for each measure relative to the other countries. This result is 
unsurprising. Perhaps the most interesting statistics are those associated with Italy and 
Spain, who have the worst rating in terms of freedom from corruption and law & order in 
western Europe.  
 
6.1 Modelling Strategy 
Clearly the decision to invest in a conflict zone in a developing country is not the same as 
the decision to invest in say the US or EU. Investing in a developing country in general 
can be considered more risky, with investment in a conflict location an extreme example 
of this. We therefore proceed as follows. In order to control for the propensity to engage 
in risky investments, we construct a database of all firms who have invested in 
developing countries with weak institutions, based on the institution quality data 
discussed below. This controls for risk taking, and also the ability or willingness to 
operate in countries with poor institutional protection. We subsequently seek to explain 
which firms are then willing to invest in conflict zones, which may be seen as a more 
extreme situation. 
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As we outline above, we do this through the use of a panel probit model, but before 
presenting the results it is important to consider a number of econometric issues. Firstly, 
there is the issue of colinearity in the explanatory variables. Some of the correlations 
reported in table A3 are high, but these typically are simply correlations between 
measures of size. They do not present a colineraity problem, and the summary of the VIF 
tests are reported below table A3. 
Secondly, as some firms may repeatedly invest in the same set of countries, there is the 
possibility of serial correlation. We tested for this using the most reliable test for serial 
correlation, as discussed in  Gourieroux et al (1985). This involves the use of an 
asymptotic “score test” for serial correlation. The null of no serial correlation is not 
rejected for any of the sets of results that we report below.  
The final issue is one of endogeneity in the institution variables. Some of the literature 
discussed above suggest a theoretical relationship in which ifdi can influence the 
institutions  of a country. It is therefore necessary to test for this, and we do so under the 
null of no serial correlation, using a likelihood ratio test. This fails to reject the null that 
the institution variables are endogenous8.  
Finally, as we outline above, there are numerous measures of phenomena such as 
institutional quality, or ownership structures, so our strategy proceeds as follows. Starting 
with the baseline model that uses traditional variables seeking to capture differences in 
the FDI decision, such as age, size, intangible assets, sector and performance, we 
augment this with the measures of institutional quality, such as freedom from corruption, 
protection of law and order, and internal conflict in the home country. These measures 
are designed to capture a range of institutional differences, but in practice tend to be 
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correlated, and so we introduce these on an individual basis. For completeness, we also 
replace these with a set of country dummies to capture differences in the home country. 
The baseline equation employs freedom from corruption, as the variable most used in the 
FDI flows literature discussed  above. We then employ the others in turn, and finally 
replace these with country dummies to examine the importance of home 
countrydifferences  of these on the decision to invest in a conflict country. In order to 
confirm the final specifications we employ a series of RESET tests for overall model 
specification, following the work of Peters (2000) and Gourieux et al (1987).  
Table 2 gives some simple descriptive statistics for each of the variables used in the 
following analysis. Included are the mean, standard deviation and the maximum and 
minimum values for each variable. In addition to this Table A1.1 in Appendix A contains 
the correlation matrix for the FDI variables. 
Table 2 here 
 
 
Tables 3A and 3B presents the results of our baseline probit specification (column 1). 
These report comparable specifications, using two alternative measures of shareholding 
concentration. Initially we focus on the importance of the leading shareholder (3A) and 
then on the herfindahl of all shareholdings (3B). The results however are consistent 
across these alternative indicators.  
The results illustrate the firm level determinants of a firm’s decision to invest in a conflict 
location. More specifically they represent the decision of a firm that has already chosen 
to invest in low income countries with weak institutions, to also invest in a conflict 
location. Given this particularly restrictive question, the models work particularly well. 
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The control variables work as expected, profitability is associated with this type of FDI 
and are consistent with the OLI theory outlined above. Intangible assets and number of 
subsidiaries are positive. Equally, the effect of age is positive, but again with a turning 
point9, suggesting that the most established firms shy away from this type of activity. The 
results concerning age and size can also be linked to the issue of CSR. Small firms are 
perhaps too small to attract criticism, or perhaps are set up for the specific purpose of 
investing in sensitive locations, while the largest firms are extremely diversified and may 
be able to hide certain activities. The other control variables, subsidiaries, cash flow and 
intangible assets work as expected.  
We also find unqualified support for hypothesis two. The coefficients on the sectoral 
dummies show not surprisingly mining and agriculture are positive and significant. Firms 
in these sectors are some 15% and 7% respectively more likely to engage in FDI in 
conflict zones. Those sectors governed by geography are more likely to engage in FDI in 
conflict zones. It is noticeable however than manufacturing firms are more likely to 
invest in such locations, though this again is linked to the desire to source key inputs. Our 
results show that the extent of this strategy goes well beyond what may have been 
thought of as the traditional sectors of this type of activity. High-technology industries, 
which include financial services and manufacturing, show a high probability of being 
attracted to such locations. Transportation, not surprisingly, is less likely to be attracted to 
conflict countries. 
Firm size is inversely associated with this behaviour, though with a turning point, 
suggesting that it is the smaller and largest firms that are most likely to invest in conflict 
locations, which provides support for hypothesis three. 
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Table 3A here 
Of more interest are the ownership variables, both in terms of the firm specific variables, 
and the home country variables. There is strong support for hypothesis one. From even 
within the developed world there are large differences in the propensity to invest in 
conflict countries. Spain, Italy and France appear far more likely to invest in conflict 
countries than Germany or   USA or the UK, although the UK is positive but small, 
perhaps indicative of certain ex colonial ties. This provides support for the arguments 
around hypothesis one, in that there are significant differences in the propensity of 
different countries to invest in conflict regions, and that these are explained by 
differences in home country institutions. This is then extended further to include 
transition countries, with India and Brazil being significantly more likely to invest in 
conflict locations. The marginal effects, reported in the appendix are also informative 
here. Italian firms for example are nearly 37% more likely to invest in a conflict zone 
than the average, while Japanese firms are 12% less likely. Of the emerging countries, 
India is the most likely to invest in conflict zones, 38% more likely than the average. 
These results are replicated by the model that employs ownership concentration in the 
form of the herfindahl of ownership concentration, which are reported in table 3B.  
Table 3b here 
The country effects are confirmed by the measures of institutional quality, with all three 
measures being negatively associated with FDI to conflict countries. Firms from 
countries with lower corruption, less internal conflict, and better law and order are less 
likely to invest in conflict zones. This is consistent with both the analysis based on CSR, 
and the resource based view of the firm. Firms from countries with traditionally weaker 
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institutions (even within the developed world) are more likely to be willing to engage 
with such locations, having more experience with managing resources in challenging 
environments. It is also likely that such firms may face less criticism or questioning over 
the ethics of their investments, than in say the US, UK or Germany.  
 The impact of ownership concentration is positive across all specifications, and both 
measures of ownership concentration, providing strong support for hypothesis 4such that 
concentrated firms are more likely to invest in conflict locations. This is consistent with 
the discussion of both CSR and the work of Peng (2008) and Doukas and Lang (2003) 
that is linked in H4.  
 
7. Conclusion 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to explain the prevalence of firms to 
invest in conflict countries. Numerous authors have pointed out the extent to which 
political instability deters FDI, and rather fewer, typically from outside the IB or strategy 
area have commented on particular examples of western firms investing in politically 
unstable or ethically questionable locations. However, what we have shown here is that 
the relatively standard models that seek to explain variations in FDI propensity, including 
size, intangible assets, subsidiaries and age, still explain the marginal decision to invest in 
a conflict region, even taking into account the decision to invest in a low income country 
with relatively weak institutions. Our analysis suggests that of some 2509 firms that have 
chosen to invest in such countries, over 540 have invested in conflict countries. Thus, 
while existing literature that points out the extent to which internal conflict deters FDI 
may well be correct, it by no means deters all firms. These findings have important 
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implications for the more general literature concerning the links between FDI and 
development. We discuss in detail above the literature that has sought to link FDI and 
institutional quality to post conflict development, but this largely ignores the motivation 
for such firms to invest. Driffield and Love (2007) have shown that the motivation for 
FDI is an important determinant of the impact that foreign firms have on a host location, 
but this work can be extended to consider the prospects for FDI contributing to post 
conflict development.  The results presented suggest some room for optimism as well as a 
note of caution. In a recent commentary Narula and Driffield (2012) argue that FDI-
assisted development is based on the transfer of firm specific resources, and their 
interaction with location advantages. Our results suggest that ownership advantage is an 
important motivator for FDI in conflict zones, with the expectation that this will improve 
economic performance improvement in the host country.  
However, Narula and Driffield (2012) further point out that multinationals also gain 
through arbitrage in location advantages and attaining economic rents not available to 
local agents. The issue of rent capture is clearly an important one in unstable locations, 
and as Rose-Ackerman (2002, 2008) suggests, may be more destabilising. More work is 
needed here, but our results suggest that firms from countries with weak institutions are 
more likely to invest in conflict locations. On the one hand, such firms have potentially a 
greater likelihood of success, and therefore of longevity, on the other, it suggests that FDI 
may not be a vehicle for the transfer of good governance, as much of the more optimistic 
development literature suggests.  
Potentially the most important findings from this research relate to the importance of 
ownership structures and institutions in the home country as  determinants of this 
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decision. Firms from countries with relatively strong traditions of CSR are less likely to 
engage in conflict FDI. This is not perhaps surprising as a growing body of research 
(Murry and Vogel, 1997; Sen and Bhattacharya, 2001 and Yoon et. al., 2006) indicates 
that consumer behaviour provides incentives to firms to engage in socially responsible 
behaviour; to pay more, to switch brands, to buy products from a company because of its 
charitable donations. Thus the commercial benefits of such socially responsible 
behaviour are more likely to be undermined within firms engaged in FDI in conflict 
zones from countries where traditions of CSR are strong. Conversely there is also a 
growing body of literature asserting the need for CSR to be contextualised (Halme et. al., 
2009; Crotty, 2011), to take account of different stages of economic and institutional 
development. While our data indicates that  firms from countries with a weak CSR 
culture were not deterred from investing in conflict zones, our conclusion is dependent on 
assuming a western definition, of CSR namely that is voluntary  (Carroll and Shabana, 
2010), about going beyond compliance  (Davis, 1973) and informed by stakeholders 
(Michell et. al., 1997). Firms from such countries may not have a ‘weak’ CSR culture, 
but may in fact have different interpretations of what CSR is and how it should be 
enacted, which may include regulating for CSR or directing policy to shape the scope of 
CSR activity undertaken by individual firms. This highlights a potential area of research 
on the importance of ownership and governance for international business in general. 
Much of the existing literature focuses on the importance of corruption for international 
business and international business research, with a focus on the host country. Our 
research however stresses the importance of both firm level characteristics, and home 
country characteristics. This therefore highlights the role of home country governance 
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and institutions in explaining FDI decisions. Thus in terms of further work, our paper  
suggests a need for a better analysis of CSR at the country level, to better understand the 
motivations of certain countries to invest in such locations, and to appreciate more readily 
what is understood by CSR in such locations. Beyond this, our findings  also suggests a 
link to possible case study or survey work to determine more about the activities of  
investors on an individual basis, to understand the commercial trade-offs in investing in 
conflict zones verses the loss of CSR benefits within existing markets.  
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Table 1: Institutional Quality by Home country: ICRG Indicators 
 
Country  Freedom from Corruption  Internal Conflict Law & Order 
Brazil 2.65 9.64 2.08 
France 3.66 9.75 4.94 
Germany 4.63 11.34 5.28 
India 2.46 7.68 4.00 
Italy 2.81 10.26 4.68 
Japan 3.17 11.28 5.24 
Portugal 4.23 10.67 5.01 
Spain 4.08 8.81 4.59 
United Kingdom 4.53 9.69 5.79 
United States 4.14 10.54 5.41 
Notes: These scores are the average between 1997-2009. 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Conflict Dummy 0.231 0.421 0 1 
ln Profitability 10.472 2.760 -0.193 17.551 
ln Sales 13.090 2.501 1.183 19.731 
ln Sales Squared 177.593 64.807 1.400 389.319 
ln Cash Flow 10.636 2.696 -0.431 17.429 
ln Fixed Intangible Assets/ Total Assets -3.396 2.158 -17.528 -0.143 
Age  49.410 41.339 1 517 
Age  Squared 4150.141 8905.746 1 267289 
Number of Subsidiaries 68.421 130.797 0 1729 
Number of Directors  11.810 8.713 1 100 
largest Shareholder  49.892 35.401 0.010 100 
Herfindahl 0.397 0.382 0.000 1.000 
Mining 0.030 0.171 0 1 
Manufacturing 0.501 0.500 0 1 
Agriculture 0.009 0.096 0 1 
Transport 0.048 0.214 0 1 
Public Services 0.008 0.086 0 1 
High Technology 0.201 0.401 0 1 
Low Technology 0.145 0.352 0 1 
Brazil 0.001 0.029 0 1 
France 0.155 0.362 0 1 
Germany 0.048 0.214 0 1 
India 0.003 0.056 0 1 
Italy 0.073 0.261 0 1 
Japan 0.038 0.190 0 1 
Portugal 0.009 0.097 0 1 
Spain 0.186 0.389 0 1 
Switzerland 0.023 0.151 0 1 
UK 0.057 0.232 0 1 
USA 0.177 0.382 0 1 
Freedom From Corruption 3.898 0.860 1 6 
Internal Conflict 10.069 0.992 3.417 12 
Law & Order 4.943 0.722 1 6 
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Table 3A: determinants of FDI in conflict zones (using Largest Shareholding) 
 
 
Variables/Model 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
     
ln Profitability 0.0301* 0.0458*** 0.0376** 0.0411** 
 (0.0166) (0.0164) (0.0164) (0.0164) 
ln Sales -0.315*** -0.343*** -0.309*** -0.340*** 
 (0.0426) (0.0409) (0.0409) (0.0406) 
ln Sales Squared 0.0127*** 0.0124*** 0.0116*** 0.0124*** 
 (0.00160) (0.00153) (0.00152) (0.00152) 
ln Cash Flow 0.0867*** 0.0547*** 0.0572*** 0.0549*** 
 (0.0170) (0.0169) (0.0170) (0.0169) 
ln Fixed Intangible 
Assets / Total Assets 
0.0344*** 0.0460*** 0.0334*** 0.0414*** 
 (0.00676) (0.00661) (0.00638) (0.00652) 
Age  0.00642*** 0.00507*** 0.00495*** 0.00487*** 
 (0.000647) (0.000626) (0.000613) (0.000631) 
Age Squared -0.00002*** -0.00002*** -0.000016*** -0.000012***
 (0.000003) (0.000003) (0.000003) (0.000003) 
Number of 
Subsidiaries 
0.000913*** 0.00102*** 0.000988*** 0.00101*** 
 (0.000114) (0.000111) (0.000110) (0.000111) 
Number of directors  -0.00656*** -0.00133 0.000861 -0.000836 
 (0.00145) (0.00141) (0.00142) (0.00142) 
Largest Shareholder  -0.000250 0.00169*** 0.00140*** 0.00157*** 
 (0.000404) (0.000342) (0.000345) (0.000343) 
Mining 0.322*** 0.234*** 0.213*** 0.234*** 
 (0.0735) (0.0707) (0.0708) (0.0706) 
Manufacturing 0.124*** 0.0355 0.0616 0.0383 
 (0.0412) (0.0403) (0.0406) (0.0404) 
Agriculture 0.762*** 0.456*** 0.510*** 0.450*** 
 (0.116) (0.115) (0.114) (0.116) 
Transport 0.0139 -0.0216 -0.0169 -0.0265 
 (0.0625) (0.0614) (0.0617) (0.0614) 
Public Services 0.0330 -0.162 -0.148 -0.150 
 (0.146) (0.144) (0.146) (0.144) 
High Tech 0.106** -0.00507 -0.00918 -0.0133 
 (0.0473) (0.0460) (0.0461) (0.0460) 
Low Tech -0.110** -0.186*** -0.187*** -0.188*** 
 (0.0497) (0.0486) (0.0489) (0.0487) 
Brazil 0.370    
 (0.279)    
France 0.351***    
 (0.0389)    
Germany -0.159***    
 (0.0591)    
India 1.038***    
 (0.183)    
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Italy 1.025***    
 (0.0494)    
Japan -0.599***    
 (0.0707)    
Portugal -0.606***    
 (0.161)    
Spain 0.459***    
 (0.0409)    
UK 0.00580    
 (0.0535)    
USA 0.122***    
 (0.0368)    
Freedom from 
Corruption 
 -0.136***   
  (0.0135)   
Internal Conflict   -0.152***  
   (0.0117)  
Law & Order    -0.145*** 
    (0.0159) 
Constant -0.566** 0.808*** 1.495*** 0.987*** 
 (0.287) (0.272) (0.277) (0.276) 
     
Observations 16,932 16,898 16,898 16,898 
Pseudo R2 0.1111 0.0784 0.0816 0.0776 
Correct Predictions 78.56% 77.87% 78.12% 78.00% 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3B: determinants of FDI in conflict zones (using herfindahl of Shareholding) 
 
      
Variables/Model (1) (2) (3) (4)  
      
ln Profit 0.0455*** 0.0367** 0.0407** 0.0296*  
 (0.0166) (0.0166) (0.0165) (0.0167)  
ln Sales -0.333*** -0.300*** -0.330*** -0.309***  
 (0.0408) (0.0408) (0.0405) (0.0425)  
ln Sales Squared 0.0120*** 0.0113*** 0.0121*** 0.0125***  
 (0.00153) (0.00152) (0.00152) (0.00160)  
ln Cash Flow 0.0532*** 0.0560*** 0.0534*** 0.0855***  
 (0.0170) (0.0171) (0.0171) (0.0171)  
ln Fixed Intangible 
Assets / Total Assets 
0.0473*** 0.0345*** 0.0427*** 0.0354***  
 (0.00666) (0.00643) (0.00657) (0.00680)  
Age  0.00504*** 0.00492*** 0.00484*** 0.00639***  
 (0.000624) (0.000610) (0.000629) (0.000645)  
Age Squared -0.000017*** -0.000016*** -0.000017*** -0.000021***  
 (0.000003) (3.05e-06) (0.000003) (0.000003)  
Number of 
Subsidiaries 
0.00104*** 0.00100*** 0.00103*** 0.000922***  
 (0.000111) (0.000110) (0.000111) (0.000115)  
Number of directors 
in 2009 
-0.00147 0.000748 -0.000967 -0.00673***  
 (0.00141) (0.00142) (0.00142) (0.00145)  
Herfindahl of 
ownership 
0.147*** 0.115*** 0.137*** -0.0214  
 (0.0321) (0.0323) (0.0321) (0.0365)  
Mining 0.231*** 0.209*** 0.231*** 0.320***  
 (0.0707) (0.0708) (0.0706) (0.0735)  
Manufacturing 0.0265 0.0524 0.0297 0.116***  
 (0.0404) (0.0407) (0.0405) (0.0414)  
Agriculture 0.456*** 0.509*** 0.450*** 0.758***  
 (0.115) (0.114) (0.116) (0.116)  
Transport -0.0230 -0.0186 -0.0278 0.0133  
 (0.0614) (0.0617) (0.0613) (0.0625)  
Public Services -0.166 -0.153 -0.154 0.0268  
 (0.144) (0.146) (0.144) (0.146)  
High Tech -0.00679 -0.0117 -0.0152 0.105**  
 (0.0461) (0.0463) (0.0462) (0.0475)  
Low Tech -0.193*** -0.193*** -0.195*** -0.115**  
 (0.0486) (0.0489) (0.0487) (0.0498)  
Brazil    0.379  
    (0.280)  
France    0.360***  
    (0.0387)  
Germany    -0.152**  
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    (0.0592)  
India    1.048***  
    (0.183)  
Italy    1.030***  
    (0.0494)  
Japan    -0.584***  
    (0.0702)  
Portugal    -0.602***  
    (0.161)  
Spain    0.456***  
    (0.0410)  
UK    0.0116  
    (0.0534)  
USA    0.137***  
    (0.0366)  
Freedom from 
Corruption 
-0.137***     
 (0.0135)     
Internal Conflict  -0.153***    
  (0.0118)    
Law & Order   -0.146***   
   (0.0159)   
Constant 0.805*** 1.503*** 0.985*** -0.584**  
 (0.272) (0.277) (0.275) (0.287)  
      
Observations 16,821 16,821 16,821 16,855  
Pseudo R2 0.0782 0.0815 0.0774 0.1111  
Correct Predictions 77.89% 78.09% 77.99% 78.56%  
 Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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APPENDIX A 
 
 
Table A.1 Correlation Matrix1 
 
 Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 Conflict Dummy 1.00          
2 ln Profitability 0.22 1.00         
3 ln Sales 0.21 0.93 1.00        
4 ln Cash Flow 0.23 0.96 0.93 1.00       
5 ln Fixed Intangible 
Assets/ Total 
Assets 
0.13 0.42 0.43 0.41 1.00      
6 Age  0.13 0.33 0.36 0.34 0.13 1.00     
7 Number of 
Subsidiaries 
0.21 0.44 0.45 0.44 0.21 0.21 1.00    
8 Number of 
Directors  
0.13 0.47 0.48 0.48 0.25 0.22 0.29 1.00   
9 largest Shareholder  -0.06 -0.37 -0.37 -0.35 -0.27 -0.13 -0.17 -0.25 1.00  
10 Herfindahl -0.06 -0.37 -0.36 -0.35 -0.28 -0.13 -0.18 -0.24 0.96 1.00 
 
                                                 
1 While some of the correlations appear high, these typically are simply due to differences in firm size. 
Standard VIF tests confirm that the multicollinearity is not a problem; the value of the test statistics vary 
from  2.9 to 3.6 across the models, well under the normal threshold of 5. 
 43
 
Table A. 2 Marginal Effects for Largest Shareholder Model  
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
ln Profitability 0.013 0.011 0.012 0.009 
ln Sales -0.100 -0.090 -0.099 -0.090 
ln Sales Squared 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.004 
ln Cash Flow 0.016 0.017 0.016 0.025 
ln Fixed Intangible Assets/ Total Assets 0.013 0.010 0.012 0.010 
Age  0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 
Age  Squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Number of Subsidiaries 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Number of Directors  0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.002 
largest Shareholder  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Mining 0.074 0.067 0.074 0.103 
Manufacturing 0.010 0.018 0.011 0.035 
Agriculture 0.154 0.175 0.152 0.270 
Transport -0.006 -0.005 -0.008 0.004 
Public Services -0.044 -0.041 -0.041 0.010 
High Technology -0.001 -0.003 -0.004 0.031 
Low Technology -0.052 -0.052 -0.052 -0.030 
Brazil    0.120 
France    0.110 
Germany    -0.043 
India    0.380 
Italy    0.367 
Japan    -0.132 
Portugal    -0.130 
Spain    0.145 
UK    0.002 
USA    0.036 
Corruption -0.040    
Internal Conflict  -0.044   
Law & Order   -0.042  
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Table A3 Marginal Effects for Herfindahl Model 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
ln Profitability 0.013 0.011 0.012 0.008 
ln Sales -0.097 -0.088 -0.097 -0.088 
ln Sales Squared 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.004 
ln Cash Flow 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.024 
ln Fixed Intangible Assets/ Total Assets 0.014 0.010 0.012 0.010 
Age  0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 
Age  Squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Number of Subsidiaries 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Number of Directors  0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.002 
Herfindahl 0.043 0.033 0.040 -0.006 
Mining 0.073 0.066 0.073 0.102 
Manufacturing 0.008 0.015 0.009 0.033 
Agriculture 0.154 0.174 0.152 0.269 
Transport -0.007 -0.005 -0.008 0.004 
Public Services -0.045 -0.042 -0.042 0.008 
High Technology -0.002 -0.003 -0.004 0.031 
Low Technology -0.053 -0.053 -0.054 -0.032 
Brazil    0.124 
France    0.113 
Germany    -0.041 
India    0.384 
Italy    0.369 
Japan    -0.129 
Portugal    -0.130 
Spain    0.144 
UK    0.003 
USA    0.040 
Freedom From Corruption -0.040    
Internal Conflict  -0.045   
Law & Order   -0.043  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 See for example 
http://www.ethicalconsumer.org/CommentAnalysis/CorporateWatch/GenocideinSudan.aspx 
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2 A Wall St Journal Article published on the 9th of November 2009 discusses a report published by the 
Heinrich Böll Foundation criticising Italian energy giant Eni SpA’s plans to squeeze oil from the tar sands 
of  the Republic of Congo. “This is a particularly dirty form of oil production and it is being planned for an 
area that’s highly sensitive in ecological terms,” said Dr. Sarah Wykes, one of the authors of the report. In 
reply Eni said that the tar-sands project would involve “no destruction of primary forest; no occupation of 
existing farmland; no impact on areas of high biodiversity; and no…resettlement of people.” This is a 
classic example of the sort investment that this paper is interested in studying.  
3 For further discussion of this see Barkema and Vermeulen (1998) 
4 This variable only being available for the final year in the BvD data 
5 Clearly, both definitions of “conflict” and “low levels of development” are not clear cut. We subsequently 
have tested the sensitivity of our assumptions by making both definitions more and less restrictive, and re 
run the estimation based on the different samples. The results reported here are robust to these alternative 
assumptions, and so for brevity these additional results are not reported. 
6 We exclude companies where the parent is based in a tax haven.  
7 The NACE 2-digit codes for each of these sectors are as follows: Mining 10 to 14; Manufacturing 15 to 37; 
Agriculture 01, 02, 05; Transportation 60, 61, 62, 63; Public Services 75, 80, 85; High-Tech Services 64 65, 
66, 67, 70, 71 72 73 74; Low-Tech Services 50 51 52 55 60 63 90 91 93 95. This classification is consistent 
with Erostat. 
8 This is perhaps not surprising, as for this to be rejected, this would require an individual FDI decision by a 
given firm to influence the macro level institutional variables. 
9 Likelihood Ratio tests reveal that the models which include squared terms result in a statistically 
significant improvement in model fit. For example, the LR test for model 1 using the largest shareholder as 
a measure of concentration yields a test statistic and p-value of 106.26 and 0.000 respectively. 
